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XII—THE DISTINCTION IN KIND BETWEEN
KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF
MARIA ROSA ANTOGNAZZA
Drawing inspiration from a well-attested historical tradition, I propose an
account of cognition according to which knowledge is not only prior to
belief; it is also, and crucially, not a kind of belief. Believing, in turn, is not
some sort of botched knowing, but a mental state fundamentally different
from knowing, with its own distinctive and complementary role in our
cognitive life. I conclude that the main battle-line in the history of episte-
mology is drawn between the affirmation of a natural mental state in
which there is a contact between ‘mind’ and ‘reality’ (whatever the onto-
logical nature of this ‘reality’) and the rejection of such a natural mental
state. For the former position, there is a mental state which is different in
kind from belief, and which is constituted by the presence of the object of
cognition to the cognitive subject, with no gap between them. For the lat-
ter position, all our cognition is belief, and the question becomes how and
when belief is permissible.
I
Introduction. If I had to summarize this paper in a few words,
I would use two complementary slogans: ‘Knowledge first’, but
‘Give belief its due!’1
For the past century, epistemological debates have focused on a
conception of knowledge as a kind of belief which meets certain cri-
teria. As any student of epistemology will know, after Gettier argued
in 1963 that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge,
scores of philosophers have searched for the elusive condition(s)
which can turn true belief into knowledge. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy still informs us that ‘much of epistemol-
ogy revolves around questions about when and how our beliefs are
1 ‘Knowledge first’ is the way in which Williamson summarizes his milestone book on
knowledge (Williamson 2000, p. v).
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justified or qualify as knowledge’ (Schwitzgebel 2019). Yet the sup-
posedly ‘traditional’ analysis of knowledge as true belief plus some
other necessary and sufficient conditions continues to run into
counter-examples and charges of circularity.
In light of this recurrent failure, the calls for alternative accounts
are growing louder. Notably, John Hyman (1999; 2015, esp. pp.
159–90; 2017) opposes the view that knowledge is a species of be-
lief, and proposes an original account of knowledge as the ability to
be guided by the facts; and Timothy Williamson, in his ground-
breaking Knowledge and Its Limits (2000), argues for a new ‘knowl-
edge-first epistemology’. Williamson’s key manoeuvre is to invert
the previously ‘standard’ relationship: rejecting the twentieth-
century orthodoxy that regards belief as conceptually prior to
knowledge, Williamson advocates the conceptual priority of knowl-
edge to belief. Knowledge, he argues, can be characterized without
reference to belief, while belief can be characterized by reference to
knowledge (2000, pp. 4–5). Knowing, Williamson argues, is a state
of mind: the most general truth-entailing or ‘factive’ mental state.
On the other hand, ‘believing p is, roughly, treating p as if one knew
p’. ‘Knowledge’, he continues, ‘sets the standard of appropriateness
for belief. . . . [T]he further one is from knowing p, the less appropri-
ate it is to believe p. Knowing is in that sense the best kind of believ-
ing. Mere believing is a kind of botched knowing’ (Williamson
2000, p. 47). In short, for Williamson, knowing entails believing,
but this entailment does not imply that knowledge is analysable in
terms of belief. For his part, Hyman argues that belief should be de-
fined in terms of knowledge: ‘we can define the belief that p as the
disposition to act (think, feel) as one normally or generally would if
one knew that p’ (2017, p. 285). But he rejects the view that the con-
cept of knowledge has a primary or basic role or position in our sys-
tem of mental and logical concepts.
I propose to push this revolt against post-Gettier epistemology
further, in a more radical manner. The first step in doing so is to
challenge the crude history of philosophy underlying the entire
Gettier paradigm, according to which knowledge has been tradition-
ally conceived of as justified true belief (jtb). A careful survey of the
history of epistemology reveals that this allegedly ‘standard’ or ‘tra-
ditional’ analysis is in fact neither standard nor traditional. On the
contrary: it is difficult to find major philosophers for thousands of
years who framed the problem of knowledge and belief in these
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terms; and what the main historical movements and authors did say
about human cognition is most often strikingly at odds with this so-
called standard analysis (see Antognazza 2015, pp. 165–72; Dutant
2015; Ayers and Antognazza 2019). In fact, leading representatives
of the Western philosophical tradition do not merely reverse the rela-
tionship between knowledge and belief: they conceive of knowledge,
belief and the relationship between them in a very different way.
According to these traditional views, knowing and believing are dis-
tinct in kind, in the strong sense that they are mutually exclusive
mental states: the same cognitive subject cannot, simultaneously and
in the same respect, be in a state of both knowing and believing the
same thing. Knowing is not ‘the best kind of believing’; nor is believ-
ing to be understood derivatively from knowing.
The view that knowledge and belief are distinct in kind in this
strong sense is routinely dismissed in contemporary literature as so
obviously implausible as to deserve little or no discussion (see
Williamson 2000, p. 42; Alston 1991, pp. 70–1; Pasnau 2017, p.
219). My proposal breaks decisively with this trend by showing that
this view is well-attested in the history of epistemology, and provides
the basis for an account of cognition that avoids many of the pitfalls
discussed in the literature.
I will argue that, according to a persistent traditional strand of
thought which should be recovered, there are two fundamentally dis-
tinct modes of cognition which can be roughly identified by a con-
trast between seeing and not-seeing. A remarkably clear formulation
of this contrast is found in Aquinas:
the reason why the same thing cannot simultaneously and in the same
respect be known and believed, is that what is known is seen whereas
what is believed is not seen [scitum est visum et creditum est non vi-
sum]. (Thomas Aquinas, ST iia–iiae, q.1, a.5 ad 4)2
In this tradition, the state of ‘seeing’ (or ‘grasping’) is regarded as the
most fundamental, primitive cognitive mode. I use the term ‘knowl-
edge’ as shorthand for a family of cognate states which are usually
indicated by terms such as episteme, nous, noesis, katalepsis; scien-
tia, scire, intellectus, intelligere (with their derivatives in Romance
languages); Wissen, wissen, begreifen; knowledge, knowing,
2 Summa Theologiae (Thomas Aquinas 1886–7) is cited as ‘ST’ followed by part, question,
article and adversus numbers where appropriate. Translations are my own unless otherwise
stated.
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understanding. For this tradition, knowledge derives directly from
its object which is present in a primitive and irreducible way to the
mind of the knower. That is, knowledge is a primitive perception or
an irreducible mental ‘grasping’ or ‘seeing’ the object of cognition
with no gap between knower and known.
This mental state is contrasted with another mode of cognition
in which the object of cognition is not directly seen or grasped. I
use ‘belief’ as shorthand for a family of cognate states usually indi-
cated by terms such as doxa, pistis; opinio, opinari, fides, credere
(with their derivatives in Romance languages); Glaube, glauben,
Meinung, meinen; belief, believing, opinion, opining, credence,
faith. For this tradition, belief is a mental state or a cognitive mode
in which the perception or presence of the object which character-
izes knowledge is lacking. Given this distinction in kind, belief can-
not be turned into knowledge without ceasing to be belief, for the
simple reason that the state of not-seeing cannot be turned into the
state of seeing without ceasing to be not-seeing. More succinctly,
‘seeing’ cannot be a species of ‘not seeing’. Aquinas is again re-
markably clear on the mutual exclusivity of these two mental
states. They cannot both pertain to the same person at the same
time and in the same respect:
all knowledge [scientia] is acquired through some self-evident, and
therefore ‘seen’, principles [principia per se nota, et per consequens
visa]. And for that reason it is necessary that whatsoever is known is,
in some way, seen [quaecumque sunt scita aliquo modo esse visa].
Now, as stated above, it is not possible that the same thing should be
believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is indeed impossible
that the same thing be known and believed [scitum et creditum] by the
same person. Nevertheless it may happen that what is seen or known
[visum vel scitum] by one, is believed by another. (Thomas Aquinas,
ST iia–iiae, q.1, a.5)
It is crucial to note that the grounds for believing may be very strong,
and belief can be true and strongly justified—and still, on this genu-
inely traditional account, such belief would not be knowledge, but a
different mental state or cognitive mode. Much traditional episte-
mology would certainly have agreed that justified true belief is not
sufficient for knowledge—not because something else should be
added to true justified beliefs, but because knowledge is something
fundamentally different from belief.
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Drawing inspiration from this historically well-attested model of
cognition, I propose an account according to which knowledge and
belief are irreducibly distinct kinds of ‘thinking with assent’.3
According to this proposal, knowledge is not a kind of belief—not
even ‘the best kind’ of believing, as in Williamson’s proposal. In
turn, ‘mere believing’ (that is, on Williamson’s account, believing
without knowing) is not ‘a kind of botched knowing’, but a mental
state fundamentally different from knowing, with its own crucial
and distinctive role in our cognitive life. Contrary to the claim that
belief aims at knowledge (Williamson 2000, pp. 47–8), I argue that
the specific contribution of belief to our cognition is that of aiming
at truth where and when knowledge is out of our cognitive reach
(either for objective or for subjective reasons). In this framework,
therefore, belief aims at truth, not at knowledge.
Finally, on this account, knowledge is first in the sense that, onto-
logically, knowing is the most primitive mode of our cognition,
without which there would be no successful cognition. It is not first,
however, in the sense that believing has a non-reciprocal, conceptual
dependence on knowing: although believing can be understood in
terms of not knowing, knowing can likewise be understood in terms
of not being in a state of believing.
Before trying to make my case, an important clarification is in or-
der. This discussion is not about which words are used or have been
used in a particular language to indicate the main modes of human
cognition.4 It is about the identification of the main cognitive modes
themselves, whatever they are called or have been called in present
discourse or in the history of human thought. The claim is that,
across time, languages, and different philosophical systems, a promi-
nent strand of thought can be traced which identifies in a broadly
similar way some key distinctions in human cognition. In my view,
the very fact that, despite vastly different philosophical commit-
ments, certain patterns keep reappearing provides a good indication
that these patterns are tracking something which is phenomenally
manifest prior to further metaphysical and epistemological claims
such as realism or idealism, empiricism or rationalism, and so on.
There is a good chance that these distinctions are carving nature at
its joints, whatever the labels used in different languages and
3 This account will be developed in Antognazza (forthcoming). I am very grateful to the
Mind Association for supporting this project with a Mind Senior Research Fellowship.
4 Pace Dutant (2015, p. 112) and Pasnau (2017, p. 219).
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historical periods. There is in fact no clean translation from one lan-
guage to the other, or from one historical period to the other, of
what is called what. The same term may be used by different authors
or in different periods to indicate quite different things. And yet a
careful study of the history of philosophy reveals some remarkably
recurrent ways of identifying the fundamental modes of our cogni-
tion which resurface across otherwise sharply distinct philosophical
views and terminology.
II
The Distinction in Kind in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern
Thought. In a paper co-authored with Michael Ayers, I have already
traced the conception of knowledge and belief between Plato and
Locke (Ayers and Antognazza 2019). In the following section, I will
limit myself to briefly summarizing the distinction in kind between
knowledge and belief in ancient, medieval, and early modern
thought, before devoting more space to what happened to this dis-
tinction after Locke.
The Apprehension of ‘What Is’. The identification of fundamentally
distinct and mutually exclusive modes of cognition, as well as of a
cognitive mode in which contact is made with ‘what is’ (that is, with
reality), goes back at least as far as Parmenides. Parmenides’s only
extant work (a hexameter poem) distinguishes ‘the way of truth’
(aletheia) from ‘the way of belief’ (doxa). With Plato, the distinction
in kind between knowledge and belief becomes one of the hallmarks
of a hugely influential philosophical tradition which subsequently
shapes Western thought. The most extended and explicit develop-
ment of this view is found in Republic v–vii.5 As I see it, the key
message of the Republic is as follows. Knowledge is a state of mind
in which—contrary to what happens with belief or doxa—what re-
ally is, is seen. Or, conceiving of it as a power, knowledge is the
power to see the Forms, as opposed to opinion, which is the power
to judge of appearances. Like the prisoner freed from the cave, it is
only by turning away from doxa and appearances toward the intelli-
gible world or world of being that knowledge is achieved. In Plato’s
5 This traditional reading of Republic v–vii has been challenged by Fine (1979; 1990).
Fine’s ‘extremely unorthodox’ reading has been convincingly rejected, to my mind, by
Gonzales (1996).
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Republic, knowledge and belief are two different mental states or
faculties with distinct cognitive functions: knowledge is a direct cog-
nitive apprehension of what really is; belief is a judgement about
what appears to be.
A tentative remark in a footnote of Gettier’s short paper of 1963
sparked, however, an opposite interpretation, which has been as
dominant in analytical epistemology as the myth that justified true
belief is the ‘standard’ or ‘traditional’ analysis of knowledge. Plato,
Gettier claims in his first footnote, seems to be considering a defini-
tion of knowledge as justified true belief at Theaetetus 201, and
perhaps accepting one at Meno 98 (Gettier 1963, p. 121).
But is this what Plato is actually doing? (compare Ayers and
Antognazza 2019, pp. 5–11). In the Theaetetus, Plato does indeed
consider an account of knowledge (episteme) in the neighbourhood
of the jtb analysis formalized by Gettier, but only to reject it. In
Meno 98, what Socrates claims to know is that knowledge and cor-
rect judgement (or true belief) are different, not how they are differ-
ent. The explanatory account of how they are different just given at
Meno 98a in terms of the addition of a reason (aitia, logos) to true
belief, is straightaway demoted to guesswork at Meno 98b. Most im-
portantly, there is something which Socrates knows (namely, that
true belief and knowledge are different) without having an account
of this difference. It follows that at least some knowledge is more
primitive than any true belief plus an account and is already presup-
posed by the process of ‘working out’ the reason or logos of certain
beliefs or judgements. In short, the Meno already bears the suspicion
of circularity toward a jtb type of account, which will be brought to
the forefront in the third part of the Theaetetus.6 The upshot is that
cognition starts with something irreducibly primary which is already
knowledge. Knowledge is not a complex and, therefore, derivative
entity resulting from something else (true belief, judgement, opinion)
plus the addition of some other ingredient.
Nous, Episteme, and Katalepsis. For Aristotle, cognition is, at its
most basic, one of the natural states or natural activities of which
certain kinds of living beings are capable. It is set apart from other
natural states or activities by a peculiar feature, namely, the kind of
6 This point is convincingly argued by Sedley (2004, pp. 176–8). Compare Ayers and
Antognazza (2019, pp. 9–10) and Gerson (2009, pp. 28–30).
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unity which the cognitive act establishes between perceiver and per-
ceived, or between knower and known—a kind of unity in which
the ontological distinction between perceiver and perceived, knower
and known, is at the same time maintained. This unity is observed
by Aristotle, first of all, in sense-perception:
The actuality of the object of perception and of the senses are one and
the same, but their being is different. I mean, for example, actual sound
and actual hearing. For it is possible for someone who has hearing not
to be hearing; and what has sound is not always making a sound. But
whenever what is able to hear is in actuality hearing and whatever is
able to sound is sounding, then actual hearing and actual sounding
come about simultaneously. . . . And since there is one actuality of the
sensible object and what is capable of perceiving, though their being is
different, it is necessary that what is spoken of in this way as hearing
and sounding perish or be preserved at the same time (Aristotle,
De Anima, Book iii, ch. 2, 425b, 426a; translation by Shields, in
Aristotle 2016, pp. 52–3).
It seems to me that the core of Aristotle’s position as outlined in the
passage above is as follows: the act of perceiving consists in a pure
presence or manifestation of the object of perception to the perceiver
with no gap between them. In this respect, intellectual ‘perception’ is
analogous, for Aristotle, to sense-perception: ‘Both reasoning and
understanding seem to be a sort of perceiving, for in both of these
cases, the soul discriminates something and comes to know things
that are’ (De Anima, Book iii, ch. 3, 427a; Aristotle 2016, p. 55).
Later on, the Scholastics translated Aristotle’s view as cognoscens in
actu et cognitum in actu sunt unum (‘in the act of knowing, the
knower is one with the known, in its being known’), and called this
unity ‘intentional’. It is this intentional unity that is captured meta-
phorically by reference to cognitive ‘contact’ and the absence of a
‘gap’. In brief, to be known is to be present to the mind, and to
know is this presence of the object to the mind.7
Hellenistic philosophies such as Epicureanism and Stoicism con-
ceive ‘what is’, or what is ultimately real, in ways which are funda-
mentally different from the accounts provided by Plato or Aristotle.
It is therefore all the more remarkable that, notwithstanding their al-
ternative metaphysical models, they agree with Plato and Aristotle in
7 Attention to these passages and to this conception of knowledge is drawn by Vanni
Rovighi (1962, pp. 113–15; 1963–79, p. 25).
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drawing a sharp distinction between knowledge and belief, and in
acknowledging a mental state in which cognitive subjects are in con-
tact with ‘what is’. Whether the ultimately real is conceived as intelli-
gible objects or as material objects, there is a fundamental cognitive
mode constituted by the presence to a cognitive subject of those
objects. Belief, on the other hand, is a different mental state, in which
there is no such direct apprehension of ‘what is’.
Crucial to Stoic epistemology, in particular, is the notion of
katalepsis (literally, ‘grasp’), introduced by the founder of Stoicism,
Zeno of Citium, as a technical term to indicate the immediate sense-
perceptual or intellectual grasp which provides the foundation of all
cognition. In a key passage, Sextus summarizes the relationship be-
tween episteme, katalepsis, and doxa in Stoicism as follows:
For they [the Stoics] hold that three things are linked to each other:
knowledge, belief and placed between these, grasping. Of these, knowl-
edge is sure and stable grasping unalterable by reasoning; belief is
weak and false assent; and grasping is what is between these, assent to
a graspable presentation. According to the Stoics, a graspable presenta-
tion is true and such that there could not be a false one just like it.
They say that knowledge is present only in the wise, belief is present
only in base men, but that grasping is common to both groups . . .
(Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos vii.151–2/svf i.68–9;
translation from Gerson 2009, p. 104)8
The common factor in episteme and katalepsis is ‘grasp’. What sets
doxa (belief, opinion) apart from these two mental states or cogni-
tive modes seems to be precisely the lack of such a grasp. What links
all three is assent:9 episteme, katalepsis and doxa all involve assent,
but the Stoics take a very dim view of belief, since on their account
this is a mental state in which assent is given without being in con-
tact with ‘what is’—something the wise person would never do.
Needless to say, ‘assent’ and ‘belief’ are not the same thing, and
should not be confused with one another.
Scire, Credere, and ‘Thinking with Assent’. After the recovery of
Aristotle between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the distinction
between knowing (scire) and believing (credere, opinari) is spelled
8 ‘svf’ abbreviates the Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (Arnim 1903–5).
9 Gerson (2009, p. 104): ‘Minimally, the “linkage” that exists between belief, grasping and
knowledge is that they all require assent.’
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out in remarkably clear terms by Thomas Aquinas. In Summa
Theologiae iia–iiae, q.2, a.1, Aquinas starts from Augustine’s re-
mark that to believe (credere) is to think with assent (cum assensione
cogitare) (Augustine, De Praedestinatione, 2.5). Aquinas agrees, but
develops Augustine’s point by inserting it into a broader account of
cognition in which believing (credere) is compared with other cogni-
tive modes—notably, knowing (scire).
Taken in a broad sense, Aquinas argues, ‘thinking with assent’
does not capture what is distinctive of believing (credere) as a cogni-
tive mode, because the person ‘who considers the things that she
knows [scit] or understands [intelligit], [also] thinks with assent’ (ST
iia–iiae, q.2, a.1). What distinguishes understanding and knowing,
on the one hand, and opining or believing, on the other, is the differ-
ent way in which assent is determined: in understanding or knowing,
assent is directly moved by the presence of the object of cognition to
a cognitive subject, compelling assent; in opining or believing, the
object of cognition is not directly present, and assent is moved by
reasons of variable strength, leaving a role to the will:
Now the intellect assents [assentit] to something in two ways. One
way, because it is moved to assent by the object itself [ab ipso objecto],
which is known either through itself [per seipsum cognitum] (as in the
case of first principles, of which there is understanding [intellectus]), or
through something else already known [per aliud cognitum] (as in the
case of conclusions, of which there is knowledge [scientia]). In another
way, the intellect assents to something, not because it is sufficiently
moved to this assent by its proper object, but through a certain volun-
tary choice turning toward one side rather than the other. And if this is
done with doubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion [opi-
nio]; if, on the other hand, this is done with certainty [cum certitudine]
and without such fear, there will be faith [fides]. Now those things are
said to be seen [videri dicuntur] which, by themselves, move our intel-
lect or the senses to knowledge of them [ad sui cognitionem].
Wherefore it is evident [manifestum est] that neither faith nor opinion
can be of things seen [nec fides nec opinio potest esse de visis] either by
the senses or by the intellect. (Thomas Aquinas, ST iia–iiae, q.1, a.4)
The contrast between seen and not seen, tracking the contrast be-
tween known and believed, returns repeatedly throughout the part
of the Summa devoted to faith, emerging as one of the hallmarks of
Aquinas’s account (see ST iia–iiae, q.1–16).
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Evidence, Knowledge, and Belief. If we turn now to seventeenth-
century textbook historiography, we find a tendency to regard early
modern epistemology as being dominated by the ‘traditional’ con-
ception of knowledge as justified true belief. The trouble with this
account is quite straightforward: it does not square with what
Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, and other early modern thinkers
actually say about knowledge (see Carriero 2013; Ayers and
Antognazza 2019, pp. 16–23). Instead of finding in their texts the
view that beliefs are the starting point of knowledge, we find the
view that knowledge can start only by turning away from beliefs and
opinions (Descartes). Instead of finding knowledge as a species of be-
lief, we find that knowledge is a state of mind irreducibly different
from belief, since it is seeing (perceiving) what in the state of belief
we cannot see, for instance, that it is sense-perception of external,
bodily objects or mental perception of connections between two or
more ideas (Locke). At the opposite end of the metaphysical
spectrum, knowledge (in its adequate, full form) is nothing less than
a revised version of the traditional visio Dei (the vision of God) or
beatific vision—that is, a vision of all things in God (Malebranche)
or (in a more radical reconception) intuitive knowledge (scientia
intuitiva) of God as the only one substance of which everything else
is a mode (Spinoza).10 Both the Epicurean/Stoic/Empiricist strand
and the Platonic/Neoplatonic/Augustinian/Rationalist strand of
seventeenth-century epistemology think of knowledge as a kind of
seeing (by the senses or by the intellect). Neither of these strands
thinks of knowledge as a kind of belief with the addition of certain
conditions.
The invitation to turn away from opinions fills the first of
Descartes’s Meditations, and is one of the leitmotivs of the Discourse
on the Method. In these key texts of Descartes’s philosophical matu-
rity, the conception of knowledge as evidence comes fully to the
fore. Evidence is taken in its primary (and nowadays often over-
looked) sense, derived from the Latin ex (from) þ videre (to see).11
Evidence is only secondarily a set of reasons for believing something;
primarily it is a ‘visibility’ or ‘seeableness’ which allows an immedi-
ate apprehension by the mind. For Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz,
10 See especially Malebranche’s Recherche, book iii, and Spinoza’s Ethica, Part ii,
Propositions 40–47; cf. Carriero (2013, p. 184).
11 For an illuminating discussion of the primary versus secondary sense of evidence see
Ayers (2019, pp. 34, 66–7, 115–16, 118–19, 194).
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intellectual cognition connects us (at least to some extent) to the in-
telligible essences of things (Carriero 2013, pp. 184, 189).
Despite the great differences between Cartesian and Lockean epis-
temology, Locke’s definition of knowledge in the Essay (Book iv,
ch. i, §2) is in line with the Cartesian notion of a clear and distinct
vision (‘evidence’) of the connection between objects of thought. In
my view, however, the deepest common element in the Cartesian
and Lockean accounts is not their stress on relations of ideas, but
their stress on knowledge as seeing (either literally in sense-
perception or metaphorically in mental perception). ‘Knowledge’,
Locke writes, ‘seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the
connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any
of our Ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this Perception is, there
is Knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy,
guess, or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledge’ (Essay,
Book iv, ch. i, §2). From this very definition of knowledge onward,
Locke draws a sharp distinction between knowledge and belief: the
domain of knowledge is the domain in which we perceive the con-
nection (or lack of connection) between ideas; the domain of belief is
the domain in which we are unable to perceive such connection but
presume it (Essay, Book iv, ch. xiv, §4). There is no talk of justify-
ing beliefs to turn them into knowledge, or of conditions or criteria
by which beliefs can count as knowledge. Belief, for Locke, is quite
simply a different kind of epistemic state from knowledge.
To summarize. Belief is different in kind from knowledge in that it
lacks the evidence a parte rei, that is, a perception by the mind or a
presence to the mind of the object of cognition which by itself com-
pels assent. On the one hand, this is a limitation of belief, exposed as
it is to the only too familiar cases of misplaced trust, fanciful guesses,
and so on. On the other hand, belief is a cognitive mode the
importance of which is difficult to exaggerate, in that it enables us to
extend the grip of our cognition beyond our actual and, crucially,
possible knowledge.
III
The Gap between Mind and World: Scepticism Redivivus. It may be
tempting to wave through the above discussion by dismissing it as
an historian of philosophy’s pedantry. Gettier was, obviously, not
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doing history of philosophy, and neither are modern analytic philos-
ophers. No need therefore to get upset or to write long refutations.
Instead, let it be taken for granted that an innocent historical mistake
was made in attributing the jtb analysis to Plato, and that equally
innocently, this mistake mushroomed into the orthodox view for
generations of epistemology students. The next editions of episte-
mology textbooks can leave out any mention of Plato and all will be
well. In what follows, however, I will try to show that if there are
any truly innocent mistakes in history, this is not one of them.
The Inflated Use of ‘Belief’. I contend that ‘belief’ has become a
catch-all category for all sorts of mental states for historical and phil-
osophical reasons linked to the sceptical attack against a conception
of cognition according to which there is a primitive contact between
mind and reality. More specifically, the inflated use of ‘belief’ in
twentieth-century philosophy has its roots in Humean scepticism.
Once scepticism declared that all putative knowledge is really, at
bottom, belief—that is, a state traditionally conceived as lacking a
direct presence to the mind of the object of cognition—the scene was
set for a conception of belief as the umbrella under which to group
all cognitive modes. The later attempt to rescue knowledge from this
sceptical attack—via the specification of the necessary and sufficient
conditions belief must meet to qualify as knowledge—led precisely
to the conception of knowledge as jtbþ criticized in this paper and
increasingly regarded as a philosophical cul-de-sac.
It is significant that, in anglophone epistemology, it has recently
become customary to distinguish ‘belief’ from ‘credence’. The term
‘belief’ is now usually reserved for an on–off state—also labelled
‘categorical’ belief, or ‘full-blown’ belief, or ‘binary’ belief—while
the term ‘credence’ is reserved for ‘scalar’ belief, that is, for a state
which admits of degrees. ‘Credence’, however, is nothing other than
the Latin version of the Germanic ‘belief’. Their synonymity is
rooted in similar etymological origins from ‘hold dear’, ‘give credit’,
‘confide’, ‘trust’.12 Interestingly, the artificially distinct use of these
two terms in present-day anglophone epistemology cannot be repli-
cated in a straightforward way in Romance languages such as Italian
or French. This distinct use signals, however, something very
12 Note that, unlike ‘belief’ and ‘credence’, ‘assent’ does not share these etymologies—this
is, in my view, another important indication that belief/credence and assent should not be
conflated.
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important, namely, a growing acknowledgement in anglophone epis-
temology that aspects of our cognition that have commonly been
subsumed in post-Humean epistemology under the notion of ‘belief’
need instead to be distinguished.
In sum, as noted by William Alston, over the past century or so,
anglophone epistemology has been characterized by ‘an inflated use
of “believe”’ in which ‘the term “belief” has been allowed to spread
over any positive propositional attitude’ (Alston 1996, p. 20). This
blanket use of ‘belief’ was, however, far from standard in the philo-
sophical tradition stretching back to antiquity. Nor was it approved
by the very architect of anglophone epistemology, John Locke, who
took such great care in ensuring that the term ‘belief’ was not a gen-
eral term which also covered knowledge.
Most importantly, in post-Humean anglophone epistemology, the
term ‘belief’ has been employed in an equivocal way which has con-
flated different things. On the one hand, it has been used to indicate
an act or state of mental acknowledgement or affirmation—a mental
act or mental state which is marked in the history of philosophy by
terms such as sunkatathesis; assensio, assentio (ads-), assentire (with
their derivatives in Romance languages); assent, agreement, affirma-
tion, assertion, positing; Fürwahrhalten, Anerkennung, Bejahung,
Zustimmung, Setzung. This mental acknowledgement or affirmation
applies generally, irrespective of whether what is affirmed is directly
seen or grasped (compelling assent), or is not directly seen or
grasped. On the other hand, ‘belief’ has also been used to indicate
the specific mental state or mental act by which something which is
not directly seen or grasped is nevertheless affirmed on the basis of
reasons of varying degrees of strength, rendering assent more or less
justified.
Of course, as I have mentioned above, what is important is not
what terms we choose to indicate a more general cognitive mode
and its species, but what the most fundamental modes of human cog-
nition are and how they are distinct from one another. One could
continue to use ‘belief’ for genus and species. But I see no advantage
in this equivocal use in a philosophical context, when there is an his-
torically well-attested way to mark this key distinction, as well as,
more importantly, an historical reason which explains why the
equivocal and inflated use of ‘belief’ is not philosophically neutral.
What is at stake is whether there are or are not cognitive mental
states which are different in kind: that is, whether there is a mental
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state in which there is a cognitive contact with ‘what is’, and a men-
tal state in which there is no such contact. If all our cognition is re-
duced to the latter (namely, to what a long tradition going back to
Plato calls ‘belief’ as opposed to ‘knowledge’), the gap between mind
and reality makes it impossible to be sure whether our cognition
ever hits the mark. In short, scepticism wins the day.
Scepticism is, of course, as old as philosophy. Views which raise
sceptical worries or have sceptical implications go as far back as the
Presocratics and the Sophists, not least as far as the relativism
expressed by Protagoras in the famous motto, ‘Man is the measure
of all things’.13 One of the most significant ways in which Humean
philosophy shaped early modern and modern Western thought is by
breathing new life into Protagoras’s ancient dictum. This is not at all
to claim that Hume’s thought can be regarded as a straight case of
relativism, subjectivism or scepticism. There are, however, sceptical
aspects to it that have far-reaching consequences and which, I claim,
have informed in a significant way the jtbþ theory of knowledge. It
is in fact important to note that ancient scepticism (and scepticism
more broadly) typically accepts the Platonic distinction between real-
ity and appearance, but unlike Plato, holds that as cognitive subjects
we have access only to appearances. That is, the only cognitive mode
available to us is belief, not knowledge. A similar awareness of the
distinction in kind between knowledge and belief, coupled with the
conclusion that we really only achieve belief, is also found, I argue,
in Hume.
‘All Our Knowledge Degenerates into Probability’. Hume devotes
only a few pages to knowledge proper (see Treatise, Book i, part iii,
§i and Book i, part iv, §i; Enquiry, §4). However short and per-
functory such treatment may be, it reveals what counts, for him, as
knowledge in the strict sense, what are its limits, and how sharply it
should be distinguished from belief (see Kemp Smith 1941, pp. 349–
63). Knowledge is restricted to relations of ideas, that is, to analytic
a priori propositions. These propositions ‘are either intuitively or de-
monstratively certain’ and ‘discoverable by the mere operation of
thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in the
universe’ (Hume, Enquiry, §4; cf. Treatise, Book i, part iv, §i).
13 See Plato, Theaetetus 151e and Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos vii.60
(Against Logicians, pp. 32–3). Protagoras’s views are criticized by Plato in the first part of
the Theaetetus.
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Geometry, algebra, and arithmetic are the sciences which have this
kind of propositions as their object. These are ‘demonstrative scien-
ces’, the rules of which ‘are certain and infallible’ (Treatise, Book i,
part iv, §i).
The trouble is, Hume hastens to say, that also in these matters we
are so prone to error that ‘all our knowledge degenerates into proba-
bility’. ‘Knowledge and probability’, however, ‘are of such contrary
and disagreeing natures, that they cannot well run insensibly into
each other, and that because they will not divide, but must be en-
tirely present, or entirely absent’ (Treatise, Book i, part iv, §i). That
is, Hume is perfectly aware that probability, however high, does not
turn into knowledge (pace much present-day formal epistemology).
Knowledge and probability are two cognitive modes with distinct
natures.
This being the case, one may be surprised by Hume’s claim, a few
lines below, that ‘therefore knowledge resolves itself into probabil-
ity, and becomes at last of the same nature with that evidence, which
we employ in common life’. What Hume is saying is that although
there is, in principle, a kind of cognition which counts strictly as
knowledge, in fact, owing to the fallibility of our reason, we achieve
only probability. This weaker kind of cognition has ‘the same na-
ture’ as the kind of cognition that ‘we employ in common life’ or in
all matters of fact, namely, belief.
‘Matters of fact’ (as opposed to ‘relations of ideas’),14 includ-
ing the existence of external bodies and causal relations (that
is, necessary connections between objects), are indeed objects
not of knowledge but of belief. The latter is a natural belief,
that is, the result of natural psychological features of the hu-
man mind, analogous to the instinct which successfully guides
other non-human animals through life (see Treatise, Book i,
part iii, §iv; Enquiry, §9). Because of the way in which our mind
naturally works, we cannot but believe in the existence of external
bodies and causal relations. Whether there are (independently of
what we irresistibly believe) external bodies or causal relations is,
however, beyond the limits of our cognition. Therefore, asking
whether bodies do or do not exist is an idle question. ‘We may well
14 ‘All the objects of human reason or enquiry’ divide for Hume ‘into two kinds, to wit,
Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact’ (Enquiry, §4, part 1).
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ask’, Hume writes, ‘What causes induce us to believe in the existence
of body? but ‘tis in vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That
is a point, which we must take for granted in all our reasonings. The
subject, then, in our present enquiry is concerning the causes which
induce us to believe in the existence of body’ (Treatise, Book i, part
iv, §ii).
Belief in the independent existence of bodies, as well as belief in
causal relations and in the existence of a cognitive subject, is not
the result of reasoning but of custom or habit, and is attended by
‘some sentiment or feeling’ which distinguishes it from fiction (see
Treatise, Book i, part iv, §i, and part iii, §§vii and xiv; Enquiry,
§5, part 2). Thus what rescues us from scepticism is not reason, but
‘nature’, that is, a ‘species of instinct’ by which we naturally believe
certain things (see Treatise, Book i, part iv, §i; Enquiry, §§5 and
9). In this sense, man is the measure of all things and wondering
whether things really are as we believe them to be is simply
absurd.15
Going forward, once cognition has been reduced, in fact, to
belief and probability, it may seem that the only way to avoid
scepticism is to redefine knowledge as a special kind of belief.
This is precisely what jtbþ theories of knowledge (including
their many variants as warranted belief, strongly warranted be-
lief, belief which tracks truth, belief with a sufficiently high de-
gree of probability, belief which could not easily have been
wrong, and so on) have tried and (now according to many)
failed to do. While their intention is to keep scepticism at bay,
their recurrent failure to do so is rooted in their being, ulti-
mately, the offspring of a sceptical outlook. The crux of the
matter is not whether we are content to call (or have become
accustomed to call) ‘knowledge’ some kind of belief (however
probable, or entitled, or permissible, or incorrigible such belief
may be), but whether our cognition puts us in touch with ‘what
is’ as opposed to only what appears to be.
15 Hume writes, ‘. . . whether it be the senses, reason, or the imagination, that produces the
opinion of a continu’d or of a distinct existence [of objects]. These are the only questions,
that are intelligible on the present subject. For as to the notion of external existence, when
taken for something specifically different from our perceptions, we have already shewn its
absurdity’ (Treatise, Book i, part iv, §i).
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IV
The Distinction in Kind between Knowledge and Belief after Hume.
Wissen, Glauben, and Fürwahrhalten. Famously, Kant was awak-
ened from his ‘dogmatic slumber’ (Ak 4:260)16 by Hume. This wake-
up call set him on the path of critical philosophy, eventually leading
to a radical reconception of how the classic distinction in kind be-
tween knowledge and belief applies to human cognition.
This section argues that, like Plato, Kant thinks of knowledge and
belief as cognitive modes which are different in kind and have, in
some important cases, different objects. One key difference in respect
to Plato is that Kant inverts what can be known and what we can
only believe. Knowledge is only of what falls within the boundaries
of our possible experience bounded by space and time, the a priori
forms of our sensible intuition (Critique of Pure Reason, a26/b42,
a33/b49). That is, knowledge is only of the sensible. Physical objects
as we know them are not ‘things in themselves’ (noumena, things as
they really are), but phenomena constructed, in important respects,
by our mind; we know and conceive of them only as they appear to
us (compare Adams 1987, p. 5). Crucially, it is precisely because
they are, to some extent, mental constructions that there is no gap
between mind and phenomenal world, and knowledge is therefore
possible. Conversely, there can be no knowledge of what is sepa-
rated from us by an ontological and epistemological gap. In this re-
spect, Kant too endorses the view that a conditio sine qua non of
knowledge is the absence of a gap between cognizer and cognized.
Where there is such a gap, we have to turn to types of cognition
other than knowledge.
As shown by Andrew Chignell in his insightful paper ‘Belief in
Kant’, the genus under which Kant groups more specific cognitive
modes is Fürwahrhalten, ‘that is, “assent” or, more literally,
“holding-for-true”’ (Chignell 2007, p. 324).17 In the Canon of Pure
Reason of the first Critique (a820/b848–a831/b859), Kant offers a
fine-grained taxonomy of the modes of our cognition according to
16 Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1998) is cited using the standard a and b edition
numbering; all other works are cited as ‘Ak’ followed by volume and page number of the
Akademie edition of his works (Kant 1900–).
17 My discussion is indebted to this splendid paper, although I have a different take on
some of the issues discussed.
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which persuasion (Überredung), opinion (Meinung), belief (Glaube),
conviction (Überzeugung), and knowledge (Wissen) are all grouped
under the genus Fürwahrhalten.
In general, there is some form of assenting when we have suffi-
cient (zureichend) grounds for it. What distinguishes the different
species of assenting from one another is the combination of two dif-
ferent kinds of grounds, namely, objective grounds and subjective
grounds. Objective grounds are valid for any rational being and are
therefore, at least in principle, communicable. Typically, they not
only make assent rationally permissible, but compel or necessitate
assent. Subjective grounds, on the other hand, lay ‘solely in the sub-
ject’, that is, ‘in the particular constitution’ of a certain individual
(a820/b848).
As I interpret it, Fürwahrhalten is the generic cognitive mental act
of assenting. Classically, it is the mental act of judgement or of
‘thinking with assent’. Persuasion (Überredung), opinion (Meinung),
belief (Glaube), conviction (Überzeugung), and knowledge (Wissen)
are all different species of it. Knowledge may be seen as a species of
conviction but certainly not as a species of persuasion (Überredung),
opinion (Meinung), or belief (Glaube): objectively sufficient grounds
are in fact required by knowledge (and by conviction), whereas the
other three mental acts are partially defined by the absence of objec-
tively sufficient grounds.18 Moreover, neither knowledge nor convic-
tion appears to have, for Kant, a voluntary element. By contrast,
both opinion and belief have an element of voluntariness which, in
the absence (by definition) of objectively sufficiently grounds, plays
a role in determining assent either on subjectively insufficient
grounds (opinion), or on subjectively sufficient grounds of a prag-
matic, theoretical, or moral nature (belief). Finally, unlike persua-
sion, neither opinion nor belief imply a cognitive mistake: those who
are persuaded mistake in fact their subjective grounds for objective
grounds; by contrast, those who opine or believe are aware that they
do so on objectively insufficient grounds. Opinion and belief are,
therefore, imperfect kinds of cognition rather than cognitive failures
(see Ak 24:218). Most importantly, notwithstanding their imperfec-
tion, they have the remarkable merit of extending cognition in a sui
generis way beyond the boundaries of actual or possible knowledge.
18 Le Morvan’s rejection of the claim that, for Kant, knowledge is a species of belief tallies
with the point I am making. See Le Morvan (2017, pp. 1225–7), esp. p. 1227: ‘knowledge
(essentially) has what belief (essentially) lacks (namely, objective sufficiency)’.
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Indeed, the most remarkable cognitive role is played by theoretical
and moral belief in cases in which knowledge is unavailable not only
de facto, but also de jure: theoretical and moral belief accomplishes
the substantial feat of opening up ‘prospects’ on things-in-themselves
(see a830/b858).
The interpretation I have presented is likely to face the fairly obvi-
ous objection that the structure of Kant’s proposal is that of the
jtbþ analysis, with Fürwahrhalten or ‘assent’ playing the functional
role of what in the twentieth century is called ‘belief’. My reply is as
follows. If one wishes to call ‘belief’ what the tradition has called
‘assenting’ or ‘thinking with assent’, and Kant has called
Fürwahrhalten, this is of course fine. The issue is not which word we
use, but which mental act is referred to by that word. What is crucial
is that the mental act at stake here is a generic act of affirmation or
acknowledgment which must not be conflated with what Hume
called ‘belief’. As far as I can see, historically, the latter is the sense
of belief which has underpinned jtbþ theories. In so far as this is
the case, both the letter and the spirit of Kant’s proposal is very dif-
ferent from the jtbþ analysis of knowledge.
At the core of the Kantian proposal there is the (frankly Platonic)
idea of cognitive modes which are sharply distinguished by their
objects and by the function they play in relation to those objects.
Knowledge (Wissen) has phenomena as its objects; belief (Glaube)
has things-in-themselves as its objects. In the phenomenal world,
knowledge is possible because physical objects, as we know them,
are constituted through the a priori forms of our sensible intuition,
that is, they are in some sense mental constructions. Therefore, there
is no irreducible epistemic and ontological gap between mind and
world. By contrast, knowledge of things-in-themselves is not possible
owing to the ontological gap between the noumenal world and the
world of our possible experience bounded by space and time. We
can turn, however, to a different cognitive mode: ‘rational Belief, in
which the act of assenting has the same degree as in Knowledge [das
Fürwahrhalten eben den Grad hat als beym Wissen], but is of an-
other kind’ (Ak 16:371–72; translation modified and emphasis
added).19 This is a cognitive mode which cannot and does not bridge
the ontological gap (that is, it is not and cannot be ‘the cognition of
grounds in the object’ Ak 16:371–72) but still responds to the needs
19 Chignell (2007, p. 349 n.32) draws attention to this passage.
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of reason, opening thereby rationally grounded ‘prospects beyond
the bound of experience’ (a830/b858).20
Knowledge and Apprehension. In more recent times, the distinction
in kind between knowledge and belief is reaffirmed in uncompromis-
ingly strong terms by the philosophical movement that flourished in
Oxford in the early twentieth century and which is known as Oxford
Realism.21 Although its inspirer, John Cook Wilson (1849–1915), did
not publish a great deal during his lifetime, his philosophical posi-
tions influenced Oxford philosophy for several generations,22
grounding a tradition of Oxford realism which stretches, arguably,
as far as the current philosophical work of leading philosophers as
diverse as John McDowell and Timothy Williamson.
Cook Wilson opposes any attempt to define knowledge in terms
of belief plus additional conditions such as truth and justification.
Most emphatically, for him, knowledge is not a species of belief. In
the words of his student and later White’s Professor of Moral
Philosophy at Oxford, H. A. Prichard:
Knowing is absolutely different from what is called indifferently believ-
ing or being convinced or being persuaded or having an opinion . . .
Knowing and believing differ in kind as do desiring and feeling . . .
Their difference in kind is not that of species and genus, like that of a
red colour and a colour. To know is not to have a belief of a special
kind, differing from beliefs of other kinds; and no improvement in a
belief and no increase in the feeling of conviction which it implies will
convert it into knowledge. (Prichard 1950, p. 87)23
Furthermore, for Cook Wilson, ‘the man who knows does not be-
lieve at all what he knows; he knows it’ (1926, p. 100). That is, be-
lieving is a different mental state, which is not entailed by knowing.
20 As regards the massively controversial question of whether we can relate at all to things-
in-themselves, I side here with Chignell’s proposal of ‘Liberalism’. For ‘Liberals’, ‘theoreti-
cal reason itself can provide grounds on which to form assertoric rather than merely prob-
lematic assents about certain things-in-themselves’ (Chignell 2007, pp. 357–9).
21 On Cook Wilson and Oxford Realism, see the excellent accounts offered by Marion
(2000, 2015) and by Travis and Kalderon (2013) on which I am drawing.
22 Among others, H. A. Prichard (1871–1947), Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976), and J. L. Austin
(1911–1960). On the connection between Austin and the Oxford Realism tradition see
Longworth (2018).
23 See also Urmson (1988, p. 15): ‘I do have much sympathy with the view of Cook Wilson
and Prichard that . . . knowledge has to be contrasted with belief and opinion rather than
being treated as a special case of belief.’
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At the root of this position is the view that knowledge cannot be
reductively analysed or defined in terms of something else, because
knowledge is a sui generis, non-derivative ‘frame of mind’.24 In mod-
ern parlance, knowledge is a primitive mental state (see Travis and
Kalderon 2013, p. 499). From 1906 onwards, Cook Wilson calls
this primitive mental state ‘apprehension’. As he puts it, ‘we cannot
construct knowing—the act of apprehending—out of any elements’
(Cook Wilson 1926, p. 803). Although undefined, for Cook Wilson,
apprehension appears to be close to Aristotle’s noesis. That is, ‘ap-
prehension’ is a direct grasp of the object of cognition, a direct seeing
‘what is’. As this primitive apprehension, knowledge is presupposed
by other activities of thinking, such as believing and opining (see
Cook Wilson 1926, pp. 86–7, 92–3, 96; Marion 2015, §3).
Moreover, knowledge is not a matter of having ‘evidence’ for a
certain opinion or belief,25 but of being aware of ‘some fact of na-
ture’ (Travis and Kalderon 2013, p. 500).26 As Austin writes in a fa-
mous passage of Sense and Sensibilia:
The situation in which I would properly be said to have evidence for
the statement that some animal is a pig is that, for example, in which
the beast itself is not actually on view, but I can see plenty of pig-like
marks on the ground outside its retreat. If I find a few buckets of pig-
food, that’s a bit more evidence, and the noises and the smell may pro-
vide better evidence still. But if the animal then emerges and stands
there plainly in view, there is no longer any question of collecting evi-
dence; its coming into view doesn’t provide me with more evidence
that it’s a pig, I can now just see that it is, the question is settled.
(Austin 1962, p. 115; compare Cook Wilson 1926, p. 100)
I would like to note the structural similarity between Cook Wilson
and Prichard’s accounts and Aquinas’s two manners in which we as-
sent to something. The Oxford Realists contrast two mental states
which are different in kind: on the one hand, knowledge, that is, the
direct apprehension of an object or the awareness of a fact of nature,
24 Compare Cook Wilson (1926, p. 100): ‘our experience of knowing then being the pre-
supposition of any inquiry we can undertake, we cannot make knowing itself a subject of
inquiry in the sense of asking what knowledge is’.
25 ‘Evidence’ is taken here in its secondary sense, that is, as the reasons or arguments which
support a belief, as opposed to its primary sense as a perspicuous presentation of something
which is clearly seen or understood.
26 I take it that ‘fact’ is understood here as a concrete, as opposed to an abstract, entity. On
the importance of keeping these two conceptions of facts distinct, see Hyman’s illuminating
discussion (Hyman 2017).
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requiring no decision; on the other hand, the mental state in which
the object of cognition (the pig of Austin’s example) is not directly
present and, therefore, reasons external to the object of cognition it-
self are needed in order to take a decision (is there a pig or not?).27
Aquinas contrasts two manners in which we are moved to assent (ST
iia–iiae, q.1, a.4): on the one hand, understanding and knowledge
(intellectus and scientia) in which assent is compelled by the object it-
self (‘ab ipso objecto’) of which there is clear sight (‘manifesta visio’);
on the other hand, belief and opinion in which there is no clear sight
of the object of cognition which sufficiently moves assent, and exter-
nal reasons (‘something else already known’) are therefore needed in
order to take a decision (‘through a certain voluntary choice turning
toward one side rather than the other’).
Drawing especially on Aquinas, the neo-Scholastic movement that
thrives in Catholic circles in a period roughly contemporary to
Oxford Realism recovers and institutionalizes this and other key
insights of the thirteen-century theory of cognition.28 Neo-Scholastic
thinkers typically agree that ‘knowing, cognition, knowledge, is sui
generis, that therefore it cannot properly speaking be defined, or
explained in terms of anything other than itself’ since ‘nothing is
more intimate to us than knowing’ (Coffey 1917, p. 25). The level of
institutionalization of this view is shown by its reception in the
Catholic Encyclopedia composed between 1905 and 1914. The en-
try ‘knowledge’ begins by stating, ‘Knowledge, being a primitive fact
of consciousness, cannot, strictly speaking, be defined; but the direct
and spontaneous consciousness of knowing may be made clearer by
pointing out its essential and distinctive characteristics’. That is,
‘Knowledge is essentially the consciousness of an object’ (Dubray
1910). ‘Belief’, in turn, is described as ‘that state of the mind by
which it assents to propositions, not by reason of their intrinsic evi-
dence’. This state of mind, the entry laments, ‘is often used indiscrim-
inatingly . . . for other states of mind’; in particular, it should be dis-
tinguished ‘from the assent of knowledge’ (Aveling 1907).
Moreover, neo-Scholastic textbooks identify ‘apprehension’ or
‘simple apprehension’ (apprehensio simplex) as the starting point of
all knowledge in so far as it is ‘the act of mind’ which ‘places an ob-
ject before consciousness’ (Rickaby 1888, part i, ch. ii, §1). ‘To
27 Note that, for Cook Wilson, judging (believing and opining) are ‘decisions’ (compare
Cook Wilson 1926, pp. 93, 96).
28 For key authors and texts in this tradition, see https://maritain.nd.edu/jmc/aristotl.htm.
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apprehend’, they explain, ‘is to take hold of a thing as if with the
hand; an apprehension, as an act of the mind, is an intellectual
grasping of an object’ (Coppens 1891, Logic, book i, ch. i, §9).
Although apprehension is typically treated as an intellectual act of
mind, the neo-Scholastics acknowledge an analogous process of cog-
nitive apprehension in sense-perception, enabling ‘the animal in dif-
ferent ways to acquire cognition of the material objects with which it
comes into immediate or mediate contact’ (Coppens 1891, Mental
Philosophy, book iii, ch. ii, §161; see also Rickaby 1888, part ii,
ch. ii).
These striking similarities between two philosophical movements
as far apart as Oxford Realism and neo-Scholasticism are not too
surprising if one considers their common source in Aristotle and
other aspects of ancient philosophy. Cook Wilson and his
contemporaries at Oxford typically emerged into philosophy from
the intensive study of Aristotle (it is certainly no accident that Cook
Wilson, having read classics and mathematics at Balliol, contributed
regularly to the study of ancient philosophy). For their part, the neo-
Scholastics knew their Aristotle chapter and verse through the medi-
ation of Aquinas. Most importantly for the matter at hand, the view
of knowledge as an unanalysable, primitive mental state by which
we are in conscious cognitive contact with an object, and which is
distinct in kind from belief—a view held by both Oxford Realism
and neo-Scholasticism—indicates the strength and pervasiveness of
a tradition of non-sceptical philosophy of cognition going back to
ancient philosophy and its medieval developments, and finding its
expression in philosophical contexts with very different intellectual
agendas.
More generally, it turns out that even in the first half of the twen-
tieth century, the so-called standard analysis of knowledge is not so
standard after all. Surprisingly, the only clear-cut (as opposed to ‘in
the ballpark’) example of a definition of knowledge as justified true
belief to be found in the decades immediately preceding Gettier’s pa-
per of 1963 appears to be C. I. Lewis’s definition in An Analysis of
Knowledge (1946, p. 9): ‘Knowledge is belief which not only is true
but is also justified in its believing attitude.’29
29 This is the conclusion reached by Le Morvan (2017). Even Ayer’s definition of knowl-
edge—‘first that what one is said to know be true, secondly that one be sure of it, and
thirdly that one should have the right to be sure’ (Ayer 1956, p. 34)—is a ‘ballpark’ case
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V
Conclusion
The Main Battle-Line. According to the interpretation I have offered,
there is a dividing line in epistemology which runs horizontally
throughout the entire history of philosophy: it is the division be-
tween sceptical and non-sceptical philosophy of cognition. That is,
the main battle-line in the history of epistemology is drawn between
the affirmation of a natural mental state in which there is a contact
between cognoscens and cognitum, ‘mind’ and ‘reality’ (whatever
the ontological nature of this ‘reality’), and the rejection of such a
natural mental state. For the former position, there is a mental state
which is different in kind from belief, and which is constituted by the
presence of the object of cognition to the cognitive subject, with no
gap between them. For the latter position, all our cognition is belief,
and the question becomes how and when belief is permissible.
These two broad traditions face one another from the beginning:
one starting, roughly, with Parmenides and Plato, the other starting,
roughly, with Protagoras’s relativism and ancient scepticism.
Although in different historical periods one strand may seem to gain
the upper hand over the other, each is remarkably resilient in its ca-
pacity to take new forms adapted to the spirit of the time. Under the
pressure of Humean-type scepticism, however, sceptical philosophy
of cognition achieved a new prominence and led eventually to the
jtbþ conception of knowledge dominant in twentieth-century an-
glophone analytical epistemology. The shift to counting ‘reasonable,
warranted, justified belief’ or ‘entitled true beliefs’ as knowledge is
both a watershed in epistemology and a deviation from the compet-
ing tradition which saw a distinction in kind between knowledge
and belief (compare Pasnau 2017, pp. 43–4).30
My contention is, therefore, that the twentieth-century jtbþ ortho-
doxy is rooted, historically and theoretically, in the epistemological
strand which rejects a primitive contact or presence of reality to the
rather than a clear-cut example (compare Gettier 1963, p. 121 and Le Morvan 2017,
pp. 1223–4).
30 I fully agree with Pasnau on the fundamental importance of this shift, but disagree on
other key points, notably on what the account of knowledge as ‘reasonable, warranted, jus-
tified belief’ is shifting from, and, most importantly, on his regarding ‘reasonable, war-
ranted, justified belief’ as a more satisfactory account of knowledge than the account
offered by the rival tradition.
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mind. That is, the jtbþ analysis is, ultimately, the child of a sceptical
outlook. Uncritically accepting the view that knowledge has been nor-
mally conceived as a kind of belief which meets certain criteria is not
merely an innocent historical mistake: it is a substantive philosophical
position that dismisses without a hearing a vastly important alternative
account which has, in fact, dominated the history of Western philoso-
phy. Once a gap between mind and reality is introduced, there is no
way to bridge it. I agree with Robert Pasnau’s view that much pre-
modern epistemology was not primarily concerned with permissible
belief, but disagree that this is to be lamented as a Panglossian illusion
from which modern times eventually freed us (compare Pasnau 2017).
The heroes of my story are the many thinkers who ground cognition
in a primitive perception or an irreducible mental ‘grasping’ or ‘seeing’
‘what is’, distinct in kind from a mental state in which assent to the ob-
ject of cognition is not moved by its presence but by a variety of rea-
sons with different degrees of force.
Knowledge First, but Give Belief Its Due! A key implication of my
proposal is that, as in the best early modern tradition, the bar for
knowledge is set very high. There could be no successful cognition
without a primitive contact between mind and reality, but what we
know (and can know) is limited because, primarily or paradigmati-
cally, knowledge is akin to acquaintance and, in intellectual cogni-
tion, involves understanding.31 Its primitive mode is a non-
discursive, non-propositional perception that takes the form of both
sense-perception, which grounds sensitive knowledge, and intellec-
tual perception, which grounds intellectual knowledge. On this
primitive perception of ‘what is’ are based discursive modes of
knowledge in which the evidence of ‘what is’ is transferred step by
step by inference, as well as other cognitive modes such as memory
and recognition, in which the original cognitive contact with ‘what
is’ can be preserved (albeit with varying degrees of success).
Belief, on the other hand, is by far the most common mode of our
cognition, since assent to the object of cognition which is primitively
moved by the perception of ‘what is’ is possible only in limited cases.
Most of our cognitive activity relies on assent given for reasons
31 Aristotle’s episteme corresponds to understanding rather than justified true belief (see
Burnyeat 1984). In his insightful discussion, Carriero (2013) stresses that Descartes,
Spinoza, Leibniz and Locke are primarily interested in understanding. On the notion of ‘pri-
mary knowledge’, see Ayers (2019, esp. pp. vi, 27, 61–4, 115, 185, 195).
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external to the object itself. No amount of reasons or justification
supporting such belief will turn this mode of cognition into the ‘cog-
nition of grounds in the object’, to use Kant’s phrase, which charac-
terizes knowledge. On the other hand, justified belief is mostly very
reliable in tracking truth, and constitutes an essential mode of our
successful cognition, with enormous power of extending our cogni-
tive grip beyond what (strictly speaking) can be known.
An obvious objection is that the bar for knowledge is set too high,
and that most of what ‘we’ normally take as knowledge will not
qualify, including the enormous amount of cognition based on testi-
mony. My first reply is ad hominem: those who think that knowl-
edge is a kind of belief are hardly in a position to complain that, on
this account, too much of our cognition counts as belief. As in their
accounts, I fully acknowledge the difference between mere belief and
belief which meets conditions of justification, entitlement, and so on.
Only the latter is reliable in tracking truth. Furthermore, I fully ac-
knowledge the force of the shared intuitions which point to the key
epistemological difference between Gettiered and not-Gettiered cases
of jtb. But, unlike their accounts, I argue for a mental state which is
ontologically distinct from any sort of belief, whereas for them all
our cognition is, at bottom, some sort of belief.
Secondly, there is a key social dimension to knowledge that allows
us to count as known by the community (compare Hyman 1999, p.
433; 2015, p. 159), rather than by each individual in the community,
those aspects of ‘what is’ with which some group or individual in the
community has, or has had, the kind of cognitive contact required for
knowledge. A prime example of this is science. The level of sophistica-
tion and specialization in any of the natural sciences is such that no in-
dividual scientist can claim to have done, or be able to do by herself,
all the experiments, demonstrations, gathering of data, and so on, pre-
supposed by her own scientific work. Much of what a scientist does is
based on authority and testimony. However, in so far as there is
someone or some group in the scientific community which does have
the relevant cognitive contact with ‘what is’, that aspect is known by
the scientific community collectively although not distributively by
each individual member. At the same time, there is a vast amount of
scientific work that the scientific community itself regards as driven by
hypotheses—that is, epistemically, by justified belief, rather than
knowledge—and which plays an indispensable and ineliminable role
in scientific progress. Something analogous applies to our everyday
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cognition. Say I am upstairs in my study, and you are downstairs look-
ing in the fridge. If you see that there is no milk left, and shout to me,
‘We are out of milk!’, does this count as knowledge? Well, it depends.
On my account, you know that we are out of milk and I have a justi-
fied true belief based on your reliable testimony. For all practical pur-
poses (for instance, my going out to buy milk) it makes no difference.32
Most importantly, however, as a family community, we collectively
(but not distributively) know of the lack of milk in the fridge.
Finally, one of the key aims of my proposal is to stress the crucial
contribution to our cognition of a cognitive mode which, I argue, is
irreducibly ‘other’ than knowledge, namely belief. Belief is not some-
thing sub-standard in relation to knowledge, because belief has its
own standards, namely justification, degrees of probability, level of
support by reasons, and so on. It is a different, indispensable, and
complementary way to engage cognitively with reality and the
world. It seems to me that adult cognition is an inextricable, closely
knit fabric of knowledge and belief with different degrees of justifica-
tion. Acknowledging that much of our cognition relies on belief
rather than knowledge makes it even more crucial for belief to meet
certain criteria, since no belief is rationally justified without there be-
ing reasons which can be given in its support. Conversely, an inflated
use of the notion of knowledge often goes hand in hand with funda-
mentalism and dogmatism (including, but not only, in religious con-
texts). Knowledge first, but give belief its due!33
Department of Philosophy
King’s College London
32 I cannot enter here into a detailed discussion of a well-known issue raised by Plato in the
Meno, namely, why it is better to know the road to Larissa rather than merely having a true
belief about it. I will just say that, although knowledge and true belief may result in the
same behaviour in many (but by no means all) cases, in this case my ability to track ‘what
is’ for practical purposes is explained by the fact that someone in the community has or has
had a cognitive contact with ‘what is’. The latter mode of cognition therefore has ontologi-
cal and epistemic priority over the former.
33 I am especially indebted to Michael Ayers and Howard Hotson for many conversations on
these topics, and for their insightful feedback on an earlier draft. I have also greatly benefited
from helpful comments on my draft by John Hyman and Guy Longworth, and from discus-
sions with colleagues and friends, including Peter Adamson, Francesco Ademollo, Maria
Alvarez, Alexander Bird, Bill Brewer, Julien Dutant, David Galloway, John Hawthorne,
Clayton Littlejohn, Paul Lodge, Rory Madden, M. M. McCabe; Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum,
David Papineau, Thomas Pink, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Matthew Soteriou, and Raphael
Woolf. It is a pleasure to record my thanks to all of them. Many thanks also to Peter
Momtchiloff, who used the expression ‘give belief its due!’ when we discussed this project.
Any shortcomings and misunderstandings are, of course, solely my responsibility.
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